经理管理防御对公司债权人与股东利益的影响

经理管理防御是委托代理理论的深化,从维护经理人自身职位动机出发讨论其对公司价值的减损.本文在经理管理防御假设前提下,将公司价值分为债务资金价值和股权价值,而经理人经营策略的选择会影响二者的价值.以股东对经理人的解聘权和公司破产条件为约束,通过建立二期动态模型分析在不同经理管理防御程度下,公司主要利益相关者之间的利益分配关系,得出经理管理防御不仅损害债权人和股东利益,还对减损公司价值具有放大作用.

The Effect of Managerial Entrenchment on Creditor's Benefit and Shareholder's Interest

Based on traditional conflict of interest,mortal risk is still considered as a vital explanation to manager's behavior in principal-agent theory.However,managerial entrenchment concerning conflict of position interest signifies that manager with entrenchment motivation adopts strategies which are beneficial to maintaining his position but harmful to shareholder's interest.Although it stresses on the motivation different from traditional views,it has a vast and profound impact and generates agency costs.Comp...