有害物质在食品供应链中传播机制的混合策略静态博弈模型

食品质量安全问题已经引起各方面的广泛关注.食品的生产与销售、消费等行为主体构成食品供应链,这些都是一些独立的决策主体,因此本文从供应链管理的角度出发,采用博彝论的研究方法,在分析了供应链上食品质量安全风险产生与传播的动因、条件以及后果的基础上,建立了以供应商、制造商、销售商与消费者组成的四级三阶段线性供应链静态博弈模型,定义了质量风险传递因子与监督传递因子,对该模型进行了三阶段关联求解,得到了供应链上各行为主体的最优混合策略及混合策略纳什均衡,定量分析了静态博弈模型中上游厂商向下游传递质量风险的规律以及下游消费者对上游厂商监督的影响,提出了相关的食品供应链质量安全风险的防范措施.

The Transmit Mechanism of Harmful Matter in Food Supply Chain and Its Hybrid Strategy Static Game Model

The quality safety of food is being noticed. The production, sale and consumption of food are the composition of complete supply chain, so that the quality safety of food must be studied with the food supply chain. There are independent decision-makers on the food supply chain, and this paper uses supply chain management theory and game theory, to research reasons, conditions and results of risk production and transition on the supply chains. A mixed strategy static game model has presented, which is constructed of four steps and 3 stages linear supply chain including suppler, manufacturer, retailer and consumer; the quality safety risk-transition factor and the anti-risk factor has defined. The solution of this game, the optimal mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of each agent on the supply chain has obtained. Using quantitative analysis to research the behavior that the upriver manufacturer transmit the risk to his downstream in the static game, and the influence that the downstream consumer inspects his upriver, some useful rules have been presented and give our independent countermeasure against the risk on food supply chain.