投资机会、审计师选择与盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的检验

高投资机会企业因为投资环境的不确定性和信息不对称的存在,将产生较高的代理成本和较大的盈余管理空间。基于降低代理成本和约束盈余管理的目的,高投资机会企业更可能选择高质量独立审计师进行审计。我们以2007～2009年中国制造业上市公司为样本对独立审计审计师选择及其有效性进行了实证分析。结果显示:较之低投资机会企业,高投资机会企业的代理成本更高,但在审计师选择方面并无显著差异,导致更严重的盈余管理。实证结果为规范不同投资机会企业的审计师选择和盈余管理行为,进一步发挥独立审计师在代理冲突与盈余管理问题中的治理效应提供了证据支持。

Investment Opportunity,Auditors’ Choice,Earnings Management——Research Based on Data from China’s Listed Companies

Due to the uncertainty of investment environment and dissymmetry of information,firms with high investment opportunities have higher agency costs and greater space of earnings management space.In order to reduce the agency costs and constraint earnings management,firms with high investment opportunities tend to choose the independent auditors who can serve higher quality.According to the samples of China’s manufacturing listed companies during 2007 to 2009,this paper tests the effectiveness of the independent auditor choice.The result indicates that:the higher investment opportunity an firm has,the higher the agency cost is,however,in terms of auditors’ choice,there exists no obvious distinction compared with low investment opportunities firms,which led to more severe earning management.The empirical results offer a theoretical support to regulate behavior of firms with different investment opportunities in auditors’ choice and earnings management,to further develop effect of independent auditors in the governaning agency conflicts.