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基于锦标制度的供应链激励机制研究
引用本文:李雷.基于锦标制度的供应链激励机制研究[J].吉林大学学报(信息科学版),2013,31(4):425-431.
作者姓名:李雷
作者单位:西南财经大学高级工商管理教育中心,成都,610075
摘    要:企业与供应商间存在着委托代理关系, 而当企业拥有多家从事相同业务的供应商时, 各供应商间会相互影响。为设计出最为有效的激励机制, 针对多供应商的情况, 从锦标制度出发, 建立了一个委托人对3个代理人的模型。并引入了供应商间的相互影响因素, 考虑到不同排名位置的供应商对其他供应商的影响是不同的, 分析时对该因素加入了权重, 最后对供应商努力水平能否完全观察的情况进行了模型分析。探讨了通过分层\, 分级对供应商进行激励的合理性与有效性。

关 键 词:锦标制度  供应链  激励机制  委托代理

Study on Incentive Mechanism of Supply Chain Based on Rank-Order Tournaments
LI Lei.Study on Incentive Mechanism of Supply Chain Based on Rank-Order Tournaments[J].Journal of Jilin University:Information Sci Ed,2013,31(4):425-431.
Authors:LI Lei
Institution:EMBA Education Centre, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 610075, China
Abstract:The principal agent relationship can be found between core enterprise and its supplier. When the core enterprise owns more than one supplier running the same business, the influence among suppliers constrains the efficiency of the supply chain, the same problem can also be generated by asymmetric information, moral hazard and factors like those. Therefore, simply treating suppliers as a whole definitely, the most effective incentive mechanism can not be designed. Under the frame of rank-order tournaments, with the factors of interrelationship among suppliers taken into consideration, a model with one principal and three agents is analyzed. Because suppliers in different ranking have different influence over others, the weights of their interrelationship are also considered. Through the research, the rationality and effectiveness of incenting suppliers via classification and gradation are discussed.
Keywords:rank-order tournaments  supply chain  incentive mechanism  principal-agent
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