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基于演化博弈理论的企业间合作违约惩罚机制
引用本文:罗剑锋.基于演化博弈理论的企业间合作违约惩罚机制[J].系统工程,2012(1):27-31.
作者姓名:罗剑锋
作者单位:中南大学商学院
基金项目:湖南省哲学社会科学基金委托项目(2010JD02)
摘    要:利用演化博弈理论,建立企业间合作的违约惩罚机制模型,并进行了数值仿真研究。研究结果表明:当违约金不足以抵消背叛策略带来的超额收益时,系统将进入"囚徒困境",演化至双方均背叛;当双方都背叛时的收益最小、自己合作对方背叛的收益比双方都背叛的收益大、自己背叛对方合作的收益最大时,系统演化为"鹰-鸽博弈";当双方收益能达到双赢时,系统会演化至双方均合作或均背叛的极端;而当违约金数额足够大时,违约金机制将很好地抑制合作过程中可能出现的机会主义倾向,促进企业顺利开展长期稳定的合作。

关 键 词:企业间合作  违约惩罚机制  演化博弈  违约金

The Default Punishment Mechanism of Cooperation among Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Theory
LUO Jian-feng.The Default Punishment Mechanism of Cooperation among Enterprises Based on Evolutionary Game Theory[J].Systems Engineering,2012(1):27-31.
Authors:LUO Jian-feng
Institution:LUO Jian-feng(School of Business,Central South University,Changsha 410083,China)
Abstract:With the method of evolutionary game theory,this paper established a model for default punishment mechanism of cooperation among enterprises,and then did the numerical simulation research.The results show that: when the penalty is not sufficient to offset the excess profit brought by the betrayal strategy,the system will fall into "prisoner’s dilemma",that is,both enterprises will betray each other;when both betraying each other,the yields are smallest,who cooperate only gains more than both betraying,and who betrays only gains the largest profit,the system will evolve to "Eagle dove game";when the two sides can achieve a win-win situation,the system will evolve to both cooperating or both betraying;and when the penalty is large enough,the penalty mechanism will effectively restrain the opportunistic tendency during the cooperation,and promote enterprise to cooperate smoothly and stably for a long term.
Keywords:Cooperation among Enterprises  Default Punishment Mechanism  Evolutionary Game Theory  Penalty
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