城市旧房改造初期居民与政府的演化博弈分析

针对我国城市旧房改造初期由于政府独资财政压力大、居民观念保守和出资意愿不强导致旧房改造困难重重的情况，本研究以政府和居民作为相关利益主体，从双方动态演化博弈的视角，构建了两方博弈模型，并采用仿真模拟的方法，对演化稳定策略进行了分析，提出居民与政府在旧房改造初期达到帕累托最优均衡的对策意见。研究得出：通过对资金的引入和规划控制、实现旧房改造政策的宣传推广与组织建设、改造过程透明化和完善监督机制等措施，可以减轻政府在旧房改造中的经济和社会压力，转变居民的传统保守思想，最终实现旧房改造的顺利进行和博弈主体的利益共赢。

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Residents and Government in the Early Period of Urban Old House Reconstruction

As an important link in the implementation of the decision to actively expand effective investment in China, the reconstruction of old houses is an important measure taken by the government to expand domestic demand and the residents'' pursuit of a better life. However, due to the great financial pressure of the government, the conservative concept of residents and the weak willingness to invest, the reconstruction of old houses is faced with many difficulties. In order to seek the smooth progress of the old house reconstruction, in this paper, the government and residents in the process of old house renovation are taken as the relevant stakeholders, and a two-party game model is constructed from the perspective of dynamic evolutionary game., and uses simulation methods to analyze the evolutionary stabilization strategy,, and puts forward the countermeasures for the residents and the government to reach the Pareto optimal equilibrium in the early stage of the old house reconstruction. The research concludes that measures such as the introduction and the cost planning control of funds, the promotion and organization construction of old house reconstruction policies, the perfection of supervision mechanism and the transparency of the reconstruction process can reduce the economic and social pressure of the government''s old house reconstruction, change the traditional conservative thoughts of residents, and finally achieve the successful transformation of old houses and the win-win situation for the game subjects.