企业国际经营模式变迁的博弈模型与演化路径

运用Hotelling模型和进化博弈理论建立了国有企业和民营企业国际经营模式的战略选择方程,利用复制动态进化机制探讨在无政府补贴干预和有政府补贴干预下企业之间博弈的变迁机理.研究发现:当国际经营机会成本较小时,国有企业对民营企业具有良好的示范作用,市场会自发达到所有企业选择国际经营模式的均衡状态;当机会成本较大时,政府必须支付企业足够的补贴以增加企业国际经营利润,鼓励企业选择国际经营模式,以期为"走出去"战略的全面实施提供一定的理论参考.

Evolution path on the change of enterprises' international operational pattern based evolutionary game

State-owned enterprises and private enterprises' international operational pattern function is built on evolutionary game theory and Hotelling model, enterprise's operational pattern's change, the evolutionary equilibrium and evolution path are analyzed based on the duplicate dynamics equations respectively under the conditions of either exiting government subsidies or no exiting government subsidies. The results show that state-owned enterprises become the role model for private enterprises, the market will spontaneously reach equilibrium which different ownership enterprises all choose international operational pattern when the opportunity cost of international operational pattern is low; However, when the opportunity cost is high, the government optimally makes some subsidies to increase international operational profit and encourage enterprises choosing the corresponding operational pattern, which is expected to provide certain theoretical basis for "Going Out" strategy.