好评奖励的有限理性经济策略与演化博弈分析

以好评奖励获取用户推介并鼓励二次消费，是在线商家广泛采用的一种营销手段，但不当的奖励策略不仅会降低在线评论的参考价值，亦有损正当的网购经营环境。研究信息不完全和参与人有限理性情况下商家不同的诱导评论策略对消费者在线评论行为的影响，可以为政府监管和消费者购买决策提供参考。基于策略演化的视角构建商家与消费者群体间的博弈模型，并分析不同情境下商家的策略选择及消费者行为。实验分析表明，商家的策略选择取决于商品的销售利润、奖励成本、消费者不推荐时带来的负面效益值、政府监控及平台惩罚成本。而消费者最终的推荐行为会被信用成本、奖励额度、对商品本身的满意度等参数影响。当消费者对商品本身满意度较低，例如满意概率为0.3时，商家的返券策略无法激励消费者给予推荐甚至进行二次购买，必须以高返现弥补商品性价比低导致的顾客损失，或购买一些“好评”。而对商品满意度较高时，消费者更趋于以感知性价比和最初意愿给予评价。若政府或网络平台加强对商家的监管和社会信用体系建设，将有助于遏制商家贿赂性奖励行为的发生。

Economic strategies and evolutionary game analysis on rewards for favorable comments with bounded rationality

In Chinese online businesses, customers are often rewarded for favorable comments and this method is widely advocated for promoting more consuming. But inappropriate reward strategies decline the reference value of online reviews, and would damage the online shopping rules. It entails research work on strategic choices under incomplete information and limited rationality of participants. Based on the perspective of evolutionary game theory, a game model between merchants and consumer groups was constructed, and merchants'' strategic choices and consumer behaviors in different situations were analyzed. The results indicate that decisions of the merchant depend on the profit of the merchandise, the reward cost, the impact of negative comments from consumers, the government monitoring, and the penalty from the platform. On the other side, customers view this problem of recommendation from credits, the amount of rewards, and their satisfaction with the goods. Therefore, it will help to restrain the bribery in these incentive behaviors if the supervision to the network merchants is strengthened, and consumers have to pay higher penalty costs for the dishonest appraisal comments.