基于碳排放配额约束下的供应链订货策略及协调研究

控制碳排放是亟待解决的全球性问题.碳排放配额约束将企业的生产运作产生重要影响.考虑一个制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链，研究不同碳排放配额约束(只有零售商碳排放配额约束、只有制造商碳排放配额约束 、制造商和零售商同时有碳排放配额约束)下基于数量折扣契约的供应链订货策略及协调问题.研究结果表明：在不同碳排放配额约束下，供应链通过利用数量折扣契约能够实现协调；当只有给予零售商碳排放配额、只有给予制造商碳排放配额、制造商和零售商同时给予碳排放配额时，在碳排放配额发挥作用的情况下，碳排放配额下订货量直接决定供应链的最优订货量，供应链的期望利润也将受到碳排放配额的影响.

Order policy and coordination in supply chain based on carbon emissions quotas

Controlling carbon emissions is a global problem urgently to be solved. Carbon emissions quotas are important influence to enterprise's production operation. A supply chain composed of manufacturer and a retailer is considered in this paper. The order policy and supply chain coordination problem based on the quantity discount contract are researched under different carbon emissions quotas (only retailers carbon emissions quota restriction， only manufacturer carbon emissions quota restriction， manufacturers and retailers have carbon emissions quotas at the same time constraints). The supply chain models with game theory methods， through the contrast analysis of centralized and decentralized supply chain models， the optimal ordering strategy and coordination conditions of the supply chain is given. The results show that supply chain coordination is able to be achieved with quantity discount contract under different carbon emissions quota restriction； when carbon emission quota is considered in only retailers， only the manufacturer and both manufacturers and retailers， respectively， the optimal order quantity of the supply chain is determined by the order quantity decided by carbon emissions quotas， and carbon emissions quota will also impact the expected profit of supply chain.