国有资产流失与实际控制权的地方化

国有资产流失是改革时期理论界关注的热点。国资流失主要表现在地方政府与收购方自由谈判的产权交易中,完全架空了全民所有的性质。现有文献多数从资产定价、内部人控制、关联交易、无形资产未作评估等角度解释国有资产流失,本文则试图从国有资产实际控制权地方化的视角提供新的解释。2002年以前,"有控制权无所有权"的"责权利不对称"成为国资流失的制度原因,因为地方政府无资产能力也无法律责任承担国资的保值增值;2002年赋予地方政府"出资人所有权"的政策设计,尽管在理论上可以减少甚至消除"代理成本",然而,地方政府获得出资人所有权地位的法理基础不足,在地方政府承担多重身份的背景下,反而加速了地方政府对国有资产的变卖。

Loss of State Assets and the Localization of Actual Control

Loss of state assets attracts the attentions of theorists.Most literature explains from the angles of asset pricing,internal control,related party transactions and non-assessing of intangible assets,etc.This paper attempts to explain from a new perspective——the actual control of the local state-owned assets.Before 2002,"the control of non-ownership" and "Zequan Li asymmetric" serves as institutional reasons that interpret a loss of state assets.Local government bears no assets nor assumes liabilities for the maintenance and appreciation of state assets.After 2002,the "investor ownership" was designated on local governments.While in theory you can reduce or even eliminate the "agency cost",however,ownership of local governments to obtain the status of the investor lack legal basis.On condition of multiple identities,local governments accelerate the sale of state assets.