基于EPR制度的政府与制造商激励契约设计

生产者延伸责任(EPR)制度能有效推动制造商回收再制造活动的实施. 基于制造商逆向选择和道德风险并存的状况, 以制造商的再制造率和努力程度为不对称信息, 设计政府对制造商的激励契约. 给出了契约实施过程中满足制造商收益单调风险率和政府正向激励实施的现实条件, 分析了再制造率等因素与政府激励契约的关系, 讨论了EPR制度实施不同阶段中各类因素对政府期望收益的影响. 研究表明: 政府激励契约能较好实现制造商的高效度激励, 有效促进制造商的努力水平, 提高政府期望收益. 研究结论对EPR制度下政府环境规制的设计实施以及制造商的运营实践具有较好的现实指导意义.

Incentive mechanism between government and manufacturers based on EPR system

Implementation of the extended producer responsibility (EPR) is a key way to promote manufacturers to participate actively in collection and remanufacturing activities. Under the conditions of adverse selection as well as moral hazard, taking the remanufacturing rate and the effort extent of manufacturer as the asymmetric information, the incentive contract between the government and the manufacturer was designed. Based on the proposed incentive contract, the realistic conditions for monotone hazard rate of manufacturer's profit and implementation of government's positive incentive were provided. The relationships between parameters and government's subsidy-tax contract were analyzed. The influences of various factors at different stages of EPR implementation to the government's expected revenue were discussed. The results indicate that, the proposed contract is effective to achieve the manufacturers' high-validity motivation and effort-extent excitation, as well as to improve government's revenue. The conclusions are helpful to the design of government's environmental regulation and the operation of manufacturers under the EPR system.