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企业集团内部合作技术创新的博弈分析
引用本文:刘澄,张建斌,鲍新中.企业集团内部合作技术创新的博弈分析[J].科技与经济,2010,23(4):90-92.
作者姓名:刘澄  张建斌  鲍新中
作者单位:北京科技大学经济管理学院,北京,100083
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目 
摘    要:企业集团内部各成员单位之间通过建立合作技术创新组织,可以更好地发挥各自优势,获得集团整体利益最大化。从博弈论角度对企业集团内部合作创新的成本与收益分配问题进行了分析。结果表明:协同合作博弈时的技术创新总收益要大于非合作时的技术创新收益;集团公司合作创新组织总存在帕累托最优;合作创新的收益可以运用Rub inste in的讨价还价模型在成员企业之间进行分配。

关 键 词:合作创新  博弈理论  企业集团

Game Analysis on Cooperative Innovation Among the Enterprise Group
LIU Cheng,ZHANG Jian-bin,BAO Xin-zhong.Game Analysis on Cooperative Innovation Among the Enterprise Group[J].Science & Technology and Economy,2010,23(4):90-92.
Authors:LIU Cheng  ZHANG Jian-bin  BAO Xin-zhong
Institution:(School of Economics and Management, University of Science and Technology, Beijing, Beijing 100083, China)
Abstract:Though founding Cooperative innovation organization, member units of an enterprise group may bring their respective advantages into full play,and maximize the total benefit of the group. In this paper,cooperative innovation cost and profit allocation problem are discussed based on the game theory, and relevant conclusion is drew out. The total innovation profit under cooperative game is always more than that under non-cooperative game. Pareto Optimality is always exist in group cooperative innovation organization, the total profit of cooperative innovation can be allocated between the members by using Rubinstein bargain model.
Keywords:cooperative innovation  game theory  enterprise group
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