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定价决策权威对合作策略选择的影响分析
引用本文:李治文,罗定提,李静宏.定价决策权威对合作策略选择的影响分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,27(3):71-77.
作者姓名:李治文  罗定提  李静宏
作者单位:湖南工业大学,管理科学与工程研究所,株洲,412008
摘    要:针对一个制造商和一个销售商组成的二级供应链,在确定型市场、制造商与销售商成本信息对称的情况下,研究了成员企业合作的条件.证明了在对联合收益分配的讨价还价博弈过程中不管哪一方先行动,只要先行动一方的定价决策权威处于由双方讨价还价成本系数决定的某一范围内,理性的制造商和销售商将选择相互充分合作并按照讨价还价的结果分配联合收益,实现“双赢”.并考察了该范围随双方讨价还价成本系数变化的变动情况.相反,当先行动一方的定价决策权威处于该范围外,制造商和销售商或者其中一方选择充分合作另一方选择部分合作或者同时选择部分合作.

关 键 词:供应链  定价决策权威  讨价还价成本系数  博弈论
文章编号:1000-6788(2007)03-0071-07
修稿时间:2006年11月10

Analysis of the Effects of Pricing Power on the Selection of Cooperation Strategies
LI Zhi-wen,LUO Ding-ti,LI Jing-hong.Analysis of the Effects of Pricing Power on the Selection of Cooperation Strategies[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2007,27(3):71-77.
Authors:LI Zhi-wen  LUO Ding-ti  LI Jing-hong
Abstract:Aiming at the supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer in a determinative market,this paper studies the conditions of cooperation between firms with symmetrical cost information.We show that in the process of bargaining game on the joint profit,no matter which firm acts firstly,if its pricing power locates within the scope determined by their bargaining cost coefficients,the rational manufacturer and the retailer will choose to cooperate fully and share the joint profits according to the bargaining outcome,realizing two-winning,and furthermore,we check the alteration of this scope with the change of bargaining cost coefficients;Otherwise,if its pricing power locates beyond this scope,either one firm will choose to cooperate fully and the other will choose to cooperate partly or both of them will choose to cooperate partly.
Keywords:supply chain  pricing power  bargaining cost coefficient  game theory
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