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一种基于Shapley值的联盟结构分配方法
引用本文:李书金,张强.一种基于Shapley值的联盟结构分配方法[J].北京理工大学学报,2007,27(8):745-749.
作者姓名:李书金  张强
作者单位:北京理工大学,管理与经济学院,北京,100081;中央司法警官学院,河北,保定,071000;北京理工大学,管理与经济学院,北京,100081
基金项目:国家自然科学基金 , 面向21世纪教育振兴行动计划(985计划)二期资助项目 , 北京市重点学科建设项目
摘    要:提出一种针对联盟结构博弈问题的新的收益分配方法.通过分析Owen联盟结构博弈模型的局限性,在最大联盟不确定形成及特征函数不确定满足超加性时,建立了二级联盟结构合作博弈模型.提出了可行联盟结构条件下局中人分配规则并证明了该分配规则的性质.新分配方法保障实现个体局中人局部理性与联盟结构集体理性,是联盟结构保持稳定的一个必要条件.通过算例分析,验证了该分配方案的有效性.

关 键 词:合作博弈  联盟结构  Shapley值
文章编号:1001-0645(2007)08-0745-05
修稿时间:2006-09-21

A Method of Allocation Among Players in Coalition Structure Based on the Shapley Value
LI Shu-jin and ZHANG Qiang.A Method of Allocation Among Players in Coalition Structure Based on the Shapley Value[J].Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Natural Science Edition),2007,27(8):745-749.
Authors:LI Shu-jin and ZHANG Qiang
Institution:1. School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China; 2. The Central Institute for Correctional Police, Baoding, Hebei 071000, China
Abstract:The aim of the paper is to seek a new method of profit allocation for games with coalition structure. By presenting the limitation of the model of Owen coalition structure, the model of two levels cooperative games with coalition structure is established when the grand coalition cannot be created and the characteristic functions are not supperadditive. The rule of allocation of feasible coalition structure is constructed and the relative properties are proved. The new rule of allocation guarantees the realization of both individual rationality and collective rationality and becomes a necessary condition to keep the coalition structure stable. The validity of the method is verified by a numerical example.
Keywords:cooperation game  coalition structure  Shapley value
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