基于暗标拍卖理论的最优电力竞价机制分析

基于暗标拍卖理论,提出了一类电力竞价机制,然后运用次序统计量方法,分别对发电容量相同与不同的发电商组成的电力竞价市场,构建发电商的均衡报价模型;在模型求解基础上,分析竞价机制对市场清除价的影响,以从市场效率的角度探求最优电力竞价机制.论文最后对由5个发电商组成的电力竞价市场进行数值模拟,分析表明:在电力需求很少或很大的情况下,不同的电力竞价机制其市场效率几乎没有差异;而在一般的电力需求下,在由容量相同发电商组成的市场中,统一价竞价机制最优,但由容量不同的发电商组成的电力市场中,最优的竞价机制则是不确定的.

Analysis on Optimal Electric Power Bidding Mechanism based on Sealed-bid Auction

This paper presents a type of electric power bidding mechanisms based on sealed-bid auction theory,and models generation company's equilibrium bidding with order statistic principle,in which the cases that the same and different generation capacity among generation companys is considered,then analyzes the relation between the market clear price and bidding mechanism to explore the optimal bidding mechanism from the view of market efficiency.At last,a numerical simulation that the bidding market consisting of five generation companies is presented,and the conclusion is drawn that market efficiency is indifferent almost when elecreic power demand is fewer or larger extremely under different bidding mechanism,and when power demand is normal the uniform-price bidding mechanism is most efficient if generation capacity is same among generation companies,but the optimal bidding mechanism is uncertain if generation capacity is different among generation companies.