政府和钢铁企业间行为策略的演化博弈分析——有机朗肯循环技术推广

为了探索合理促进钢铁企业采用有机朗肯循环(organic Rankine cycle，ORC)技术回收低温余热，建立了有关我国政府机构与钢铁企业之间的演化博弈模型，分析了演化稳定性以及关键参数对演化轨迹的影响.结果表明:实施成本和环境污染税费对ORC技术的推广是非常重要的.在政治和社会效益最大化的基础上，较高的能耗和环境污染税费更加促使政府对ORC技术推广.初始选择概率值接近或者大于临界值，对双方推动ORC技术都有利.提高监管支出以及政治和社会效益，使政府更具有积极性；增加环境污染税费、ORC发电效益和减少环境污染带来的效益，使企业更具有积极性；提高运营亏损补贴和技术补助以及技术部署成本，对政府和企业都是消极的.

Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Behavioral Strategies Between Governments and Steel Works: Organic Rankine Cycle Technology Promotion

An evolutionary game model between Chinese governments and steel works is established to explore how to reasonably promote steel works to use organic Rankine cycle(ORC)technology for recovering low-temperature waste heat， and the influences of evolutionary stability and key parameters on the evolutionary trajectory are analyzed. The results show that implementation costs and environmental pollution taxes are essential for ORC technology promotion. Charging higher taxes on energy consumption and environmental pollution can provide more incentives for governments to promote the application of ORC technology based on maximizing political and social benefits. Both parties benefit from having initial probabilities that are close to or larger than the critical value for popularizing ORC technology. Increasing regulatory expenditures， as well as political and social benefits， motivates governments; adding environmental pollution taxes， ORC generation benefits， and gains from reducing environmental pollution inspires companies; increasing operational loss subsidies and technical allowances， as well as technology deployment costs， is detrimental for both governments and companies.