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行政垄断的经济分析及其对策
引用本文:张小强,许明月. 行政垄断的经济分析及其对策[J]. 重庆大学学报(自然科学版), 2005, 28(3): 141-144
作者姓名:张小强  许明月
作者单位:重庆大学,法学院,重庆,400030;重庆大学,法学院,重庆,400030
摘    要:
通过寻租理论、比较优势理论、博弈论等微观经济学工具对中国行政垄断现象进行了分析.利用经济学模型分析了行政垄断这一寻租现象的产生原因,并指出行政垄断形成的贸易壁垒不仅会增加消费者负担,而且会使企业以一种低效率、高成本的方式运行,使资源在全国范围内难以进行优化配置.通过博弈分析指出,只有对行政垄断进行严格地制度规制才能减少和消除它.进而指出中国应该建立反垄断法和行政法互为配套的反行政垄断法律制度架构.

关 键 词:反垄断法  行政垄断  寻租  比较优势  博弈论
文章编号:1000-582X(2005)03-0141-04
修稿时间:2004-10-30

Economic Analysis of Administrative Monopoly and Its Solution
ZHANG Xiao-qiang,XU Ming-yue. Economic Analysis of Administrative Monopoly and Its Solution[J]. Journal of Chongqing University(Natural Science Edition), 2005, 28(3): 141-144
Authors:ZHANG Xiao-qiang  XU Ming-yue
Abstract:
Administrative monopoly in China is analyzed with microeconomics tools such as rent-seeking theory, comparative advantage theory and game theory. A rent seeking model is given to study administrative monopoly. Futhermore, the authors propose that the barriers brought by administrative monopoly not only increase consumers burden, but also make enterprises run with high cost and low efficiency, and optimal resource distribution can not be done. Administrative monopoly can not be eliminated unless administrative monopoly is regulated within anti-monopoly law and its legal liability is enhanced, which is proved with game theory. In order to solve administrative monopoly, China should construct a law system concluding anti-monopoly law and administrative law as a reinforce.
Keywords:anti-monopoly law  administrative monopoly  rent seeking  comparative advantage  game theory
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