对国有企业经营者腐败及其遏制的经济学思考

国有企业经营者的腐败问题日益凸显。从国企经营者的“经济人”特性出发，可以发现，腐败是国企经营者经过成本一收益分析以后所作出的合乎理性的选择；从国企经营者与监管机关的查处博弈，和国企经营者与职工群众的举报博弈的角度，可以发现腐败行为的发生受到查处概率、举报成本、举报收益等因素的影响。基于此，要遏制腐败也必须从国企经营者、监督机关、职工这三方的成本一收益人手，从根源上铲除腐败滋生的土壤。

Economic Analysis of the Corruption and Containment of State-owned Enterprise Executive

The corruption problem of state-owned enterprise executive is getting worse. Based on the operator＇ s ＂economic man＂ character, we found that corruption is the sensible choice after the cost - benefit analysis of the state-owned enterprise executive. Based on the game between the operator and the supervisors, we found that corruption is affected by the investigating probability, the report cost, the report benefit, and so on. For these reasons, it is necessary to curb corruption operating from the executive, supervision organs and the reporters＇ cost-benefit.