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零售商自有品牌商品生产的委托代理
引用本文:张德鹏,苏欣. 零售商自有品牌商品生产的委托代理[J]. 系统工程, 2007, 25(5): 82-86
作者姓名:张德鹏  苏欣
作者单位:广东工业大学,经济管理学院,广东,广州,510520
基金项目:广东省自然科学基金;广东省广州市社会科学基金
摘    要:随着零售商在与制造商的博弈中不断成长以及零售行业竞争的激化,现代零售商逐渐加强了对自有品牌的经营管理力度.零售商甄选自有品牌制造商并与其形成委托代理关系,然而,该委托代理关系的建立和控制过程中存在广泛的信息不对称.本文探讨从契约签订前、后两方面来规避信息不对称带来的风险;综合运用较主观的层次分析法和较客观的人工智能神经网络方法,提出在信息不对称情况下零售商选择委托代理制造商的评价模型和指标以及委托制造商选择后的风险规避方法.

关 键 词:自有品牌  委托代理  信息不对称  风险规避
文章编号:1001-4098(2007)05-0082-05
修稿时间:2007-01-16

Agency-by-Agreement of the Production of Private Brand Commodities of Retailers
ZHANG De-peng,SU Xin. Agency-by-Agreement of the Production of Private Brand Commodities of Retailers[J]. Systems Engineering, 2007, 25(5): 82-86
Authors:ZHANG De-peng  SU Xin
Abstract:Along with retailers unceasingly growing in the contact games with manufacturers and fierce competition in retailing industry, modernized retailers are gradually increasing concern on the management of private brands. However, asymmetric information issue widely exists in the choice of manufacturers that produce private brand commodity. The paper explores how to evade the risks resulting from asymmetric information from the forward and afterward aspects of contracts signed. By comprehensively using the subjective method of Analytic Hierarchy Process and the objective method of Artificial Intelligence Neural Network, the paper brings up the evaluation indexes and methods that retailers choose agency-byagreement manufacturers, and the methods to evade the risks after choosing them.
Keywords:Private Brand    Agency-by-Agreement   Asymmetric Information    Risk Evasion
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