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水权交易机制及博弈模型研究
引用本文:李长杰,王先甲,范文涛.水权交易机制及博弈模型研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,27(5):90-94.
作者姓名:李长杰  王先甲  范文涛
作者单位:1. 武汉大学,系统工程研究所,武汉,430072
2. 中国科学院,物理与数学研究所,武汉,430071
基金项目:国家科技攻关项目;南昌大学校科研和教改项目
摘    要:针对水权交易市场最常见的买卖双方具有多人的双边交易形式,引入双边拍卖交易模式.首先给出水权拍卖交易过程,建立了不完全信息下的水权交易双方叫价拍卖的贝叶斯博弈模型;设计了水权交易双方叫价拍卖的机制,给出拍卖规则和市场出清规则,给出的机制满足有效性和激励相容性.

关 键 词:水权交易  双边拍卖  贝叶斯博弈模型  机制设计  激励相容
文章编号:1000-6788(2007)05-0090-05
修稿时间:2006年4月29日

Design of Mechanism and Bayesian Model of Water Rights Market
LI Chang-jie,WANG Xian-jia,FAN Wen-tao.Design of Mechanism and Bayesian Model of Water Rights Market[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2007,27(5):90-94.
Authors:LI Chang-jie  WANG Xian-jia  FAN Wen-tao
Abstract:It is being a new direction of water management in the world to establish tradable water rights mechanism to improve the efficient of the use and allocation of water recourses,which can achieve the optimization allocation of water recourses.So water market and water rights have been widely discussed in recent years,in which the transactions modes and models of water rights are the core in water market study of theory and practice.Based on the market norm of double auction,this paper describes the auction process of double auction in water rights market,and establishes the Bayesian model in incomplete information of water rights double tradeoffs.A mechanism design of water rights double auction is given,including auction rule and market clearing rule,and the effectivity and incentive compatibility is proved.Lastly a model implementation is given.
Keywords:water rights transaction  double auction  bayesian model  mechanism design  incentive compatible
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