董事网络位置对高管薪酬水平影响的实证研究

利用社会网络分析方法，基于“董事交叉任职”所形成的董事网络，分析了董事网络位置对企业高管薪酬的影响，以及管理层权利的中介效应和产权性质的调节效应.研究发现，在控制了其他因素后，董事网络中心度以及结构洞指数越高，对高管薪酬水平的抑制作用越强；与非国有企业相比，国有企业董事网络位置与高管薪酬的负相关关系更弱；管理层权利在董事网络位置对高管薪酬的抑制中起到了中介作用.

Empirical Study on Influence of Directors'Network Position on Executive Compensation

The method of social network was used to analyze the influence of directors’ network position on executive compensation based on the directors’ network formed by the “director cross appointment”， and the mediating effect of management rights and the moderating effect of property rights.The results showed that after controlling the other factors， the higher the directors’ network centrality and structural hole index， the stronger the inhibition effect on executive compensation level. Compared with the non-state-owned enterprises， the negative correlation between directors’ network position and executive compensation is weaker in the state-owned enterprises. Management rights play an intermediary role in the inhibition of directors’ network position on executive compensation.