On value-laden science |
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Authors: | Zina B. Ward |
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Affiliation: | 1. Auburn University, 6004 Haley Center, 351 W Thach Concourse, Auburn, Alabama, 36849, USA;2. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 229 Major Williams Hall, Blacksburg, Virginia, USA |
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Abstract: | Philosophical work on values in science is held back by widespread ambiguity about how values bear on scientific choices. Here, I disambiguate several ways in which a choice can be value-laden and show that this disambiguation has the potential to solve and dissolve philosophical problems about values in science. First, I characterize four ways in which values relate to choices: values can motivate, justify, cause, or be impacted by the choices we make. Next, I put my proposed taxonomy to work, using it to clarify one version of the argument from inductive risk. The claim that non-epistemic values must play a role in scientific choices that run inductive risk makes most sense as a claim about values being needed to justify such choices. The argument from inductive risk is not unique: many philosophical arguments about values in science can be more clearly understood and assessed by paying close attention to how values and choices are related. |
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Keywords: | Values Values in science Argument from inductive risk Motivating reasons Justifying reasons |
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