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Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information
作者姓名:Hou Wenhua International Business School  Nankai University  Tianjin  P.R. China Yao Li School of Mathematics and Statistics  Hebei Economics and Trade University  Shijiazhuang  P.R. China Wang Shouyang Institute of Systems Science  Aca
作者单位:Hou Wenhua International Business School,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,P.R. China Yao Li School of Mathematics and Statistics,Hebei Economics and Trade University,Shijiazhuang 050061,P.R. China Wang Shouyang Institute of Systems Science,Aca
基金项目:ThisprojectwassupportedbyChinesePostDoctoralScienceFoundation .
摘    要:1 INTRODUCTIONInrecentyears,manyeffortshavebeenmadetoexplorenon cooperativegametheoryfromadecision -theoreticviewpoint.Oppositetothetraditionalviewofmixedstrategiesasconsciousrandomizations,playersdonotper formrandomization .Oneplayerchoosesadefiniteactio…


Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information
Hou Wenhua International Business School,Nankai University,Tianjin ,P.R. China Yao Li School of Mathematics and Statistics,Hebei Economics and Trade University,Shijiazhuang ,P.R. China Wang Shouyang Institute of Systems Science,Aca.Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership with Uncertain Information[J].Journal of Systems Engineering and Electronics,2002,13(1).
Authors:HOU Wenhua  Yao Li  Wang Shouyang
Abstract:In the Bayesian game models, the uncertainty is described with probability, but sometimes the uncertainty in practice is given by some fuzzy parameters, and the objectives of players may be not to maximize the expected payoffs. In this paper, a new subjective equilibrium is given for fuzzy games. We make a powerful comparison with Bayesian and equilibria for Stackelberg duopoly game with fuzzy costs. It is showed that endogenous Stackelberg leadership is related with not only marginal costs but also beliefs of the firms.
Keywords:Stackelberg model  Bayesian equilibrium  Belief equilibrium  
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