基于生命周期假说的职务犯罪经济学模型

将生命周期理论引入职务犯罪问题的分析,主要探讨职务犯罪的动态特征.模型主要考虑了以下相关因素:风险概率、法制环境、惩罚力度、退休年龄与预期寿命、就业收入与退休收入.假定在职者为风险中立者,他的决策变量是不法收入,目标是在动态约束下最大化其预期效用,得到了在职者的最优策略及预期效用的显示表达式.主要结论如下:在一定条件下,在职者退休前获取不法收入是其最优策略,单纯依靠惩罚力度的加强并不一定能够有效遏制职务犯罪;退休前后的收入差异越大,发生职务犯罪的可能性越高;调低退休年龄可能增加职务犯罪;在职者可动用资源的数量越大,职务犯罪的开始时间应当越晚;收入随工作年限逐年上升的模式有助于减少职务犯罪;收入水平对职务犯罪的影响具有某种"水平效应"和"非对称性".

An Economic Model of Official Crime based on Life Cycle Hypothesis

The dynamic characteristic of official crime is analyzed by an economic model based on life cycle hypothesis.The model mainly considers the following relevant factors: the risk of being caught and the associated punishment,legislation,work and retirement wage,and retirement age and life expectancy.The individual is assumed to be risk neutral.His decision variable is illegal income. The individual's objective is to maximize the expected utility subjected to a dynamic constraint.We obtain the explicit expressions for the optimal strategy and the corresponding utility.The main results are as follows: Under certain conditions,it is rational for the individual to get income illegally before retirement,and a higher punishment is not necessarily an effective way to deter official crime;The higher the income difference before and after retirement is,the higher the probability of official crime is;To reduce the retirement age will probably increase official crime;The more resource the individual controls,the later the official crime should begin;The income pattern that work wage increases with the increase of work year is helpful to reduce official crime;The effect of income level on official crime reflects some kind of "level effect" and "asymmetry".