| 目标企业在反收购中的定价机制设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 姜秀珍,全林. 目标企业在反收购中的定价机制设计[J]. 上海交通大学学报, 2006, 40(4): 681-683 |
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| 作者姓名： | 姜秀珍 全林 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海对外贸易学院,经贸学院,上海,200063;上海交通大学,人文社会科学学院,上海,200030 |
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| 摘 要： | 在收购与反收购的对抗中,要约价格是双方谈判的焦点,成为反收购方实现股东价值增加的关键因素.依据博弈论与信息经济学中的拍卖理论,对目标企业在反收购决策中的定价机制进行设计,并得出了均衡状态下收购方与目标公司作为不同局中人的最优报价策略.结果表明,在密封式第一价格拍卖情况下,目标公司为实现收益最大化,反收购方公布的最低价格应严格高于其私人价值,收购方的报价严格低于其私人价值.
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| 关 键 词： | 目标公司 反收购 定价机制 拍卖 最优报价 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-2467(2006)04-0681-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-04-21 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-04-21 |
The Pricing Mechanism Design of Target Company in Anti-Take Over |
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| JIANG Xiu-zhen,QUAN Lin. The Pricing Mechanism Design of Target Company in Anti-Take Over[J]. Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University, 2006, 40(4): 681-683 |
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| Authors: | JIANG Xiu-zhen QUAN Lin |
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| Affiliation: | 1. School of Economy and Trade, Shanghai Inst. of Foreign Trade, Shanghai 200063, China; School of Humanities and Social Science, Shanghai Jiaotong Univ. , Shanghai 200030 |
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| Abstract: | During the confrontation of take over and anti-take over,bidder price is the focus in the negotiation,and it is the key factor adding stockholder value of anti-take over.According to the auctions theory of the game and information economics,a pricing mechanism of target company was designed in the anti-take over decision,and those players' optimal bid strategy in equilibrium was derived.The results show that in the condition of the first-price sealed auction,for maximum gain,asking lowest price should strictly be higher than its private price,and bidding price should be strictly lower than its private price. |
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| Keywords: | target company anti-take over pricing mechanism auction optimal bid |
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