基于演化博弈理论的供应链系统长期稳定性分析

针对供应链外部制造商进入供应链以后,双方可能会出现＂违约＂现象。将惩罚措施、违约额外收益以及合作超额收益、收益分摊系数引入到演化博弈矩阵中,并通过演化博弈方法寻找均衡点和鞍点。在此基础上,分别从供应链内外部制造商的角度,分析了不同情况下,双方策略的进化稳定性。研究表明：供应链内外部制造商策略的选择,不仅会受到自身＂违约＂额外收益与合作分摊收益额相对大小的影响,同时也会受到另一方＂违约＂概率大小的影响。

Analysis on Long -term Stability of Supply Chain System Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

The treaty remains violate after extraneous manufacturer entering the supply chain. A pu-nitive measure, extra benefit for breach of contract, collaboration excess return, benefit share coefficient are introduced into the evolutionary game matrices and break-even point and saddle point can be found by evolutionary game method. On this basis, evolution stability of both strategies is analyzed under different conditions from the view of the manufacturers internal and external the supply chain. Studies show that manufacturers＇ strategy choice internal and external the supply chain is not only affected by extra benefit for breach of contract and relative size of collaboration excess return, but also by the other party ＂default ＂ probability.