股票流动性影响我国企业科技创新的博弈机制

本文从股东与管理层信息不对称和目标不一致的视角,通过构建管理层和投资者的博弈模型解释股票流动性对我国企业科技创新的影响机制.本文通过模型分析发现股票流动性通过收购威胁和股东类型两种途径影响企业科技创新:在收购威胁下,股票流动性会抑制企业科技创新;在不同股东类型下,机构投资者的存在使得股票流动性降低企业科技创新,大股东作为投资者时,股票流动性既可通过提高增长率提升股票估值促进科技创新,亦可通过降低短期收益降低股票估值阻碍科技创新,综合影响取决于二者效应之和.非国有企业股票流动性对其科技创新为阻碍作用,国有企业股票流动性对其科技创新起促进作用.使用固定效应模型对博弈模型所得结论进行实证检验,实证检验结果与博弈模型结论相符,较好地验证了博弈模型分析的结果.

The game mechanism of how liquidity affects Chinese firm innovation

This paper built a game theory model to discuss how liquidity affects Chinese firm innovation from the perspective of information asymmetry and goal incompatibility. The study found liquidity affects Chinese firm innovation in two ways:Threat of takeover and different type of shareholders. In terms of threat of takeover, liquidity would harm innovation activities. In terms of type of investors, liquidity's effect differs from short-term investors and shareholders. The existence of short-term investors will make liquidity impede innovation. When firm's main investors are shareholders, influence on innovation from liquidity is depended on whether improvements of firm's valuation by rising innovation input is more than the reduction through decreasing short-term return. Taking characteristics of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises into account, we found that the stock liquidity of private company impedes its innovation and the stock liquidity of state-owned company boosts its innovation. Then we take Chinese stock market as a "natural lab" to test the conclusion of theoretical analysis with fixed effect (FE) model. The result of empirical test is similar with conclusion of theoretical analysis and reinforces the result of game theory model.