基于Stackelberg 模型的准时交货激励契约分析

以提高采购的准时交货概率为目标,针对准时采购中采购商与供应商之间的动态交互行为,建立了以采购商为主方、供应商为从方的两阶段Stackelberg主从博弈模型,并对模型最优解存在的必要条件进行了形式化数学表达和分析,进而对决策变量间、决策变量与库存成本参数间的交互影响关系进行了理论分析和证明推导.分析结果有助于采购商与供应商制定相应的采购激励策略和供应策略.

Decision Analysis of Just-in-time Delivery Incentive Contract Based on Stackelberg Model

Just in time(JIT) purchasing is an important approach to shorten the response time of supply chain efficiently and implement the agile operation of supply chain.How to quantitatively formulate and analyze the dynamic interactive relation between the strategies of purchaser and supplier is an important base of supply chain coordinated planning and decision making.On the purpose of increasing the probability of delivery on time,with purchaser as leader and supplier as follower,this paper establishes the two stage Stackelberg model about dynamic interactive decision making behaviors between purchaser and supplier.The existence requirement of optimum solution is formulated and analyzed,and the interactive influencing between decision variables of purchaser and supplier and the interactive influencing between decision variables and inventory cost parameters are analyzed and inferred theoretically.The results can help for purchaser and supplier to determine corresponding incentive strategies of purchase and supply respectively.