债转股企业的选择及其机制设计

国有企业债转股是有关利益集团围绕企业金融资源支配及企业控制权展开利益冲突的动态博弈过程，债转股实施进程应该在对各方都有利可图或者至少不被直接损害的交易中渐次完成。基于信息经济学理论框架上分析两局中人（资产管理公司和企业）有关债转股企业选择的博弈过程，认为如何挑选拟债转股企业实际上是一个机制设计的问题，当严格分析了申请债转股的企业（本质上是企业领导人）的期望效用函数并由此采取了相应的应对措施时，一个有关债转股企业选择的政策框架就形成了。

Selecting Enterprises for Swap of Debt to Equity and Mechanism Design

The swap of debt to equity in state owned enterprises is dynamic game processes of conflicting and struggling among the concerned parties for the maximization of its payoffs and the seeking of domination for financial resources, and can be accomplished successfully when its being brought into effect is going to be propitious to the concerned parties. This paper analyzes the problem of selecting enterprises for swap of debt to equity under the frame of information economics theory, and argues that the selection of enterprises for swap of debt to equity is a problem of mechanism design. As the expected utility function of enterprises is analyzed and Asset Management Corporations adopts a series of measures to deal with it according to analysis, a policy frame will have been constructed.