天然气储备及开采技术投资影响下的进出口策略研究

假定天然气进口国为了经济利益和供应安全对天然气进行储备和价格管制,而追求经济利益最大化的天然气出口国对天然气开采进行技术投资,本文在此条件下构建了天然气进出口国的动态博弈模型,并运用最优控制理论分析了进口国最优天然气消费与储备路径以及出口国最优技术投资与最优出口路径.研究表明,出口国投资效率和投资成本系数以及进口国储备偏好和销售价格对天然气进出口策略有重要影响,进口国储备稳态效用和总效用与销售价格之间均呈倒"U"型关系,且前者达到最大值时的销售价格低于后者;政府对天然气市场不适当的价格管制可能会使得天然气储备功能与预期存在偏差,甚至导致与预期完全相反的结果.研究还发现,虽然出口国可以通过垄断势力规避天然气进口国因价格管制等带来的不利影响,但同时也可能因此失去进口国因其储备偏好变化而增加的市场份额.

Import and export strategy under natural gas reserve and exploitation technology investment

Assume that the natural gas importing country carries out reserve and price control for the sake of economic benefit and supply safety, while the natural gas exporting country makes investment in exploitation technology so as to maximize economic benefit. Under this condition, a dynamic game model of an importing country and an exporting country is presented. The optimal control theory is used to analyze the optimal natural gas consumption and reserve of the importing country, as well as the optimal technology investment and export quantity of the exporting country. The research shows that the investment efficiency and the investment cost coefficient, as well as the reserve preference and selling price, have an important influence on the import and export strategy. The steady-state utility of reserve and the total utility of the importing country are both inverted “U” in relation to the selling price. And when the former reaches the maximum, the selling price is lower than that of the latter. The importer's price control may cause the reserve to deviate from its initial purpose, and even lead to a result completely opposite from the expected. The study also finds that, while the exporting country could use its monopolistic power to avoid the adverse effects generated by the gas-importing country, such as price controls, it may also lose the potential increase in market share due to changes in the importer's reserve preferences.