首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

企业竞争中的信息价值模型
引用本文:江海涛,李芳,武超然. 企业竞争中的信息价值模型[J]. 上海理工大学学报, 2016, 38(1): 62-68
作者姓名:江海涛  李芳  武超然
作者单位:上海理工大学 管理学院, 上海 200093;上海理工大学 管理学院, 上海 200093;上海理工大学 管理学院, 上海 200093
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301104)
摘    要:
为解决企业竞争中市场需求与对手成本调研的经济有效性问题,考虑市场需求信息与竞争对手信息获取的成本,建立了企业竞争的信息价值模型.通过对完全垄断市场、寡头垄断市场、完全竞争市场情形下的Nash博弈均衡讨论及计算机模拟分析发现:不同价格弹性与替代弹性的产品信息价值不同;过度调研获取完全的市场需求信息和对手成本信息并不经济;不同阶段在市场调研与竞争对手调研上存在着不同的最优投入比例.研究结论对企业如何以最小投入获取最有价值的决策信息,从而作出更好的定价与定产决策具有一定的指导意义.

关 键 词:信息价值  信息成本  企业竞争  Nash博弈均衡
收稿时间:2014-11-13

Information Value Model for Enterprise Competition
JIANG Haitao,LI Fang and WU Chaoran. Information Value Model for Enterprise Competition[J]. Journal of University of Shanghai For Science and Technology, 2016, 38(1): 62-68
Authors:JIANG Haitao  LI Fang  WU Chaoran
Affiliation:Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China;Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China;Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China
Abstract:
Information plays a key role in the competition of enterprises.To solve the problem of economic effectiveness about the market demand research and the rival cost research in the enterprise competition, the costs for the acquisition of market demand and the competitor information were considered and an information value model for the enterprise competition was established.Through the Nash game equilibrium discussion on different types of markets and the computer simulation, it is found that different types of products have different information values;getting the full information of market demand and competitor costs is not desirable, and at different stages there are different optimal investment proportion on the market research and the competitor research.The results are of certain guiding significance to how to get more valuable decision information so as to make better pricing and production plans.
Keywords:information values  information costs  enterprise competition  Nash game equilibrium
本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《上海理工大学学报》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《上海理工大学学报》下载全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号