| 关系融资、信息分享与银行激励 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 许友传,何晓光,杨继光.关系融资、信息分享与银行激励[J].系统管理学报,2008,17(1):21-24. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 许友传 何晓光 杨继光 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 1. 上海交通大学,安泰经济与管理学院,上海,200052
2. 广东商学院,金融学院,广州,510320 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 基于信息不对称假设的现行金融中介理论忽视了信息分享的重要性,提出了关系型融资模型.表明在一定的成本约束下,银行间有激励进行关于各自关系型客户信息的分享.银行关系型客户的比例越高,其信息分享的规模经济效应越明显,但由于信息分享降低了从垄断信息获取"信息租金"的比较优势,银行进行信息分享的激励会越来越弱.
|
| 关 键 词： | 关系型融资 信息不对称 信息分享 激励机制 关系融资 信息分享 银行 激励 Financing Relationship Incentive Bank Sharing 优势 比较 信息租金 信息获取 垄断 规模经济效应 比例 客户信息 成本约束 融资模型 关系型 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-2542(2008)01-0021-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006年10月9日 |
Relationship Financing,Information Sharing and Bank Incentive |
| |
| XU You-chuan,HE Xiao-guang,YANG Ji-guang.Relationship Financing,Information Sharing and Bank Incentive[J].Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications,2008,17(1):21-24. |
| |
| Authors: | XU You-chuan HE Xiao-guang YANG Ji-guang |
| |
| Institution: | 1.Antai College of Economics & Management;Shanghai Jiaotong Univ.;Shanghai 200052;China;2.School of Finance;Guangdong Business College;Guangzhou 510320;China |
| |
| Abstract: | Existing theories of financial intermediation based on the assumption of informational asymmetry have overlooked the importance of information sharing.The paper provides a model concerning relationship financing which shows that a bank has incentive to share its own relationship-style customers' information with other banks under certain cost restriction.A bank has bigger effect of scale economy,but weaker incentive to share information due to the reduction of its comparative advantages in the aspect of acq... |
| |
| Keywords: | relationship financing informational asymmetry information sharing incentive mechanism |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
