证券发行监管模式的适应性环境

通过构建监管者、发行者的博弈模型,分析了两种发行监管制度下证券市场均衡时的最优决策,提出了降低信息欺诈的方式.最后,通过比较信息欺诈水平和社会效用损失,讨论了两种制度的优劣.认为在监管制度比较完善、投资者比较成熟以及信息搜集成本、上市公司质量比较高时宜选择注册制;相反,宜选择审核制.

Applicability Environment of Securities Issuing Supervision System

This paper establishes a game model of securities supervision between issuer and supervisor,then analyzes their optimum strategy at equilibrium,and provide some method to depress information cheating level.I compares these two issuing supervision system through information cheating level and the equilibrium social welfare loss.We conclude that when law is complete,investor is mature,information cost is high and issuer is high quality,issuing registration is the best selection.