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一种考虑子公司竞合关系的跨国公司固定成本分摊方法
引用本文:雷西洋,丁彦,李姚矿,赵茜.一种考虑子公司竞合关系的跨国公司固定成本分摊方法[J].系统工程理论与实践,2019,39(7):1714-1720.
作者姓名:雷西洋  丁彦  李姚矿  赵茜
作者单位:1. 合肥工业大学 管理学院, 合肥 230009;2. 对外经济贸易大学 国际经济贸易学院, 北京 100029;3. 合肥工业大学 经济学院, 合肥 230601;4. 国网能源研究院有限公司, 北京 102209
基金项目:国家自然科学基金青年项目(71801075,71701060);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(JZ2018HGBZ0174);国家电网公司科技项目"输配电成本监管模式下电网企业成本核定技术研究与应用"(SGTYHT/17-JS-199)
摘    要:跨国公司固定成本分摊结果直接关系到跨国公司、子公司以及子公司所在地税务机关的利益,因此如何合理分摊跨国公司固定成本引起相关各方的关注.本文从跨国公司的特点出发,提出一种考虑子公司间竞争和合作(竞合)关系的跨国公司固定成本分摊方法.首先,以被广泛认可的公平交易原则为基础刻画成本分摊约束集,并指出其与数据包络分析中的有效成本分摊集是一致的.其次,在公平交易原则约束下,根据先最大化集体利益进而最大化个体利益的思路,设计相应的跨国公司成本分摊模型.最后,利用2013年某跨国石油公司的数据对方法进行验证.结果发现决策单元(DMU)规模影响在成本分摊结果得到体现,有利于分摊方案被DMU接受;同时发现联盟策略并不能保证所有DMU都能够获得比中立策略更优的成本分摊结果,但DMU联盟策略在大部分情况下有益于改善其分摊结果;此外发现迟钝型DMU更适合采取中立策略,而敏感型DMU则适合采取竞合策略.研究为解决跨国公司固定成本分摊问题提供了一种可行的思路,可为相关决策者提供有效的决策支持.

关 键 词:跨国公司固定成本分摊  数据包络分析  公平交易原则  竞合博弈  
收稿时间:2018-08-03

A study on multinational corporations' fixed cost allocation method with considering subsidiaries' competition and cooperation relationship
LEI Xiyang,DING Yan,LI Yaokuang,ZHAO Qian.A study on multinational corporations' fixed cost allocation method with considering subsidiaries' competition and cooperation relationship[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2019,39(7):1714-1720.
Authors:LEI Xiyang  DING Yan  LI Yaokuang  ZHAO Qian
Institution:1. School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China;2. School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China;3. School of Economics, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230601, China;4. State Grid Energy Research Institute Co., Ltd., Beijing 102209, China
Abstract:The fixed cost allocation of multinational corporations is directly related to the interests of multinational corporations, subsidiaries and their tax authorities. Therefore, how to reasonably allocate the fixed costs of multinational corporations has attracted the attentions from the related parties. Based on the characteristics of multinational corporations, this paper proposes a fixed cost allocation method for multinational corporations that considers the competition and cooperation relationship among subsidiaries. First, based on the arm's length principle, which has been widely accepted in practice, the cost allocation constraint set is built to ensure the practicability of the method. The constraint set is the same as the efficient cost allocation set in data envelopment analysis (DEA). Second, under the constraint of the arm's length principle, the corresponding multinational corporation cost allocation model is designed according to the concept of maximizing collective interests firstly and then maximizing individual interests. Finally, using the data of a multinational oil company in 2013 to verify our method. It is found that the DMU scale effect is reflected in the cost allocation result, which is beneficial to persuade DMUs to accept the allocation plan. Besides, it is also found that the alliance strategy can not guarantee that all DMUs can obtain better cost allocation results than the neutral strategy, but the alliance strategy is beneficial to improve the cost allocation results in most cases. In addition, we also find that the insensitive DMUs and sensitive DMUs are more suitable for adopting the neutral strategy and the competitive strategy, respectively. In a word, this study provides a feasible way to solve multinational corporations' cost allocation problems, and can provide effective decision support for decision makers.
Keywords:multinational corporations' fixed cost allocation  data envelopment analysis  arm's length principle  competition cooperation game  
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