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电力市场中电厂报价的重复博弈分析
引用本文:易伟,罗云峰.电力市场中电厂报价的重复博弈分析[J].华中科技大学学报(自然科学版),2003,31(2):75-77.
作者姓名:易伟  罗云峰
作者单位:华中科技大学控制科学与工程系
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目 ( 60 0 740 3 3 )
摘    要:利用博弈论对电厂的报价行为进行了分析。首先通过古诺模型分析了电厂单阶段博弈情况下的报价策略,然后分别研究了电厂在有限次和无限次重复博弈的过程中可能采取的战备,指出在后一种情况下电厂存在合作的可能性,并且进一步比较了不同战略下合作的可能性大小。

关 键 词:电厂  电力市场  投标策略  博弈论  重复博弈  报价策略  收益决策
文章编号:1671-4512(2003)02-0075-03
修稿时间:2002年9月11日

Analysis of the repeated games for pricing electricity in electric power market
Yi Wei Luo Yunfeng Yi Wei Postgraduate, Dept. of Control Sci. & Eng.,Huazhong Univ. of Sci. & Tech.,Wuhan ,China..Analysis of the repeated games for pricing electricity in electric power market[J].JOURNAL OF HUAZHONG UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.NATURE SCIENCE,2003,31(2):75-77.
Authors:Yi Wei Luo Yunfeng Yi Wei Postgraduate  Dept of Control Sci & Eng  Huazhong Univ of Sci & Tech  Wuhan  China
Institution:Yi Wei Luo Yunfeng Yi Wei Postgraduate, Dept. of Control Sci. & Eng.,Huazhong Univ. of Sci. & Tech.,Wuhan 430074,China.
Abstract:A game theoretical approach was presented for pricing electricity. The market was modeled as a Cournot model to analyze one stage game of participants in decision making. As in the day ahead market, generation plants must submit supply offers. This process can be modeled into repeated games where the equilibrium is very different from that in the single stage game. An example shows that generation plants have incentives to ally in some instance and the possibility of allying varies from one strategy to the other.
Keywords:electric power market  bidding strategy  game theory  repeated games
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