银行资本充足率监管制度的副作用 |
| |
引用本文: | 金华.银行资本充足率监管制度的副作用[J].武陵学刊,2011(1):67-72. |
| |
作者姓名: | 金华 |
| |
作者单位: | 湘潭大学法学院 |
| |
摘 要: | 资本充足率要求是指银行必须保持与其资产相关的最低资本金水平的法律要求。银行法中对于银行无论何时都一样的资本充足要求的问题在于,它太过于关注防范单个银行发生违约这一狭隘目标上,而很少关注银行为了符合监管要求而采取的低价抛售和信贷紧缩这些应对监管的行动所产生的外部性问题。当个别银行发生流动性问题时,正是资本充足率的法律要求,逼迫单个银行将其实务流动性危机扩散到整个系统,引发社会性的成本。
|
关 键 词: | 资本充足 流动性 金融危机 代理问题 外部性 |
The Side-effect of Capital Adequacy Regulation |
| |
Authors: | JIN Hua |
| |
Institution: | JIN Hua(College of Law,Xiangtan University,Xiangtan 411105,China) |
| |
Abstract: | Capital regulation mandates banks to maintain a minimum capital standard at all time so as to keep banks liquidity.The problem of time-invariant capital requirement is that it places too much emphasis on the objective of averting default of individual bank,without,from a systematic perspective,considering the fire-sale and credit contraction externality aimed to meet the minimum requirement of financial regulation,which transfer the trouble of individual bank to the whole economy. |
| |
Keywords: | capital adequacy liquidity financial crisis agency problem externality |
本文献已被 CNKI 等数据库收录! |
|