基于相对业绩比较的报酬契约与代理成本分析

有效的报酬契约是企业所有者激励经营者努力工作的最佳动力，该文在考虑了相对业绩比较信息条件下，运用委托代理理论探讨了将货币收入和享受闲暇作为经营者的激励物的最优报酬契约，分析了非对称信息条件下实施契约的代理成本，得出了经营者利润分享系数与影响因素之间的关系模型以及代理成本与影响因素之间的关系模型，该文还设计了经营者的股票期权激励机制，并地某些企业作了案例分析，文章阐明股票期权激励能够将经营者的长期行为和利益与企业的长期目标结合起来，是调动经营者积极性的有效手段。

Reward contract and agency costs on comparative performance information

The effective reward contract is the best motivity that the owners encourage the managers. Considering the comparative performance information, the paper used principal-agent theory to study the best reward contract for the managers which regarded money income and enjoying leisure as managers' goad, and analyzed the agency costs under asymmetric information. Then it educed the relationship model between the profit sharing coefficient of managers and the influencing factors, and the relationship model between the agency costs and the influencing factors. The paper also designed the stock options incentive mechanism, and analyzed a case against a firm. The paper clarifies that the stock options incentive mechanism is an effective means to activise managers which combines managers' long-term behavior and benefit with firms' long-term aim.