| 基于信用监管与防范的战略联盟演化博弈 |
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| 引用本文： | 王旭,王振锋,邢乐斌,代应. 基于信用监管与防范的战略联盟演化博弈[J]. 系统工程, 2008, 26(12): 37-39 |
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| 作者姓名： | 王旭 王振锋 邢乐斌 代应 |
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| 作者单位： | 重庆大学,重庆,400030 |
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| 摘 要： | 为研究联盟成员信用与自身防范对联盟稳定性的影响,基于对专有性资源的攫取是机会主义行为的动机这一前提,建立战略联盟演化博弈模型,从理论上分析了信用惩罚额度和防范成本对战略联盟稳定性的影响.研究认为,通过进行信用监管,以及联盟成员自身实施一定的防范措施,有助于实现联盟稳定.过高或过低的惩罚额度与防范成本,将不利于联盟稳定.
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| 关 键 词： | 战略联盟 信用监管 防范成本 演化博弈 |
Evolutionary Game of Strategic Alliance Based on Credit Supervision and Defense |
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| WANG Xu,WANG Zhen-feng,XING Le-bin,DAI Ying. Evolutionary Game of Strategic Alliance Based on Credit Supervision and Defense[J]. Systems Engineering, 2008, 26(12): 37-39 |
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| Authors: | WANG Xu WANG Zhen-feng XING Le-bin DAI Ying |
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| Affiliation: | WANG Xu,WANG Zhen-feng,XING Le-bin,DAI Ying (Chongqing University,Chongqing 400030,China) |
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| Abstract: | To explore the influence of credit supervision and defense on the stability of strategic alliance,an evolutionary game model is established based on the hypothesis that the opportunist has the motive for depriving proprietary core resources.We analyze the influence of credit punishment and defense cost on alliance stability.The results show that credit supervision and self defense measures are useful to maintain the stability of strategic alliances and that too high or too low penalty amount and defense cos... |
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| Keywords: | Strategic Alliance Credit Supervision Defense Cost Evolutionary Game |
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