私人股权投资退出契约安排的激励效用分析

在契约理论与委托代理理论的基础上,构建了不完全信息下的双边合约模型,分析约定退出方式的契约安排对于削减投资过程中道德风险问题、激励风险企业家努力经营,提升企业后续经营绩效的有效性.研究结合理论与实证分析,发现企业家道德风险受不同经营行为下收益的差值,企业家的剩余索取权大小,退出契约安排约定的保底收益水平,以及市场收益率水平的影响.退出契约安排对中等道德风险企业家有显著激励效用,能够促使企业家努力经营,并提升企业在IPO前的盈利能力.

Analysis of incentive effect of preplanned exit contract design in private equity investment

The paper, on the basis of contracting theory and principal-agent theory, studies the validity of the reduction of moral hazard problem, the incentive effect on the entrepreneurs, and the improvement of the ventures＇ operation performance, by introducing the preplanned exit contract design. By combining the bilateral contracting model under asymmetric information and the empirical analysis, the paper finds that the entrepreneur＇s moral hazard is related with the difference in return under the entrepreneur＇s different operation patterns, the entrepreneur＇s residual claim right, the guaranteed return rate determined in the contract, and the market interest rate. The preplanned exit contract design has a significant incentive effect on the entrepreneur with medium moral hazard problem and can stimulate the entrepreneur to endeavor to accomplish the operation goals set in the initial investment contract, and help improve the venture＇s probability betbre IPO.