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| 基于演化博弈的煤矿安全监管分析 | |
| 引用本文： | 刘洋,纪承子,伍阳.基于演化博弈的煤矿安全监管分析[J].河南科学,2012(12). |
| 作者姓名： | 刘洋 纪承子 伍阳 |
| 作者单位： | 1. 徐州矿务集团旗山煤矿通风工区,江苏徐州 221132 2. 昆明理工大学国土资源工程学院,昆明 650093 3. 云南民族大学马克思主义教学研究部,昆明 650031 |
| 摘 要： | 安全监管是提高煤矿安全生产水平的有效途径.运用演化博弈理论构建了单一煤矿群体安全生产行为博弈模型和非对称煤矿安全监察博弈模型,通过复制动态方程的动态趋势和稳定性分析对煤矿安全监管进行了深入的探讨.结果表明:降低煤矿安全生产成本,降低监察成本和提高监察效率,提高惩罚力度等都将使煤矿安全监管博弈向着良好的方向演化. |
| 关 键 词： | 安全生产管理 煤矿安全 演化博弈 演化稳定策略 复制动态方程 |
Safety Supervision Analysis of Coal Mine Based on Evolutionary Game |
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| Abstract: | The safety management is the effective way to improve coal mine safety production level.By using evolutionary game theory,the authors construct the single coal mine group safety production behavior game model and asymmetric coal mine safety supervision game model.Through the replication dynamic equation of the dynamic trend and stability analysis,the coal mine safety supervision is thoroughly discussed.The results show that the measures including reducing the coal mine safety production cost,reducing the monitoring cost,improving the monitoring efficiency,and improving the penalty are benefit to coal mine safety supervision game toward the good direction evolution. |
| Keywords: | safety production management coal mine safety evolution game evolutionary stable strategy replication dynamic equation |
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