基于风险投资退出的统一价格拍卖最优机制设计

产权交易市场中的不对称信息极易导致风险投资退出过程中的企业价值被低估. 而拍卖作为一种信息不对称背景下的价格揭示机制, 能够有效地解决价值失真问题. 本文结合运用机制设计理论和拍卖理论与方法, 设计了一套具有激励相容性和参与约束性的风险投资退出股权拍卖机制, 并得到了最优股权拍卖机制, 能够促进资源的合理配置, 并提高市场交易效率, 为政府以及相关部门提供决策参考.

Optimal mechanism design in uniform price auction for VC exit

In the equity market,asymmetric information leads the widespread problem that the value of venture enterprise project is undervalued when venture capital exits.Auction is an effective means of resource allocation and mechanism of price revealed.In this paper,by the use of mechanism design theory and auction theory,we design an equity auction mechanism with incentive compatibility and participation constraint in venture capital exit,and get an optimal auction mechanism.The equity auction mechanism is an effective solution of equity price distortion led by the asymmetric information when the venture capital exits in the equity market.