| 股权再融资与盈余管理行为的"羊群效应" |
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| 引用本文： | 张祥建,郭岚.股权再融资与盈余管理行为的"羊群效应"[J].郑州大学学报(理学版),2006,38(1):120-124. |
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| 作者姓名： | 张祥建 郭岚 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 上海财经大学财经研究所,上海,200433
2. 上海社会科学院,上海,200020 |
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| 摘 要： | 为了在股权再融资中取得比较优势,企业具有通过实施盈余管理来获取相对业绩的强烈动机,以提高潜在投资者对企业盈利能力和投资价值的判断.企业管理层试图通过虚增报告盈余误导投资者的决策行为,从而造成了股权再融资过程中盈余管理行为的群体效应.在动态博弈中,进行股权再融资的所有企业都实施最大可能的盈余管理构成子博弈纳什均衡,使虚增报告盈余的边际收益等于其边际成本.
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| 关 键 词： | 相对业绩 资本稀缺 股权再融资 盈余管理 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-6841(2006)01-0120-05 |
| 收稿时间： | 08 22 2004 12:00AM |
| 修稿时间： | 08 15 2005 12:00AM |
Research on Seasoned Equity Offerings and Herd Effect of Earnings Management Behavior |
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| ZHANG Xiang-jian,GUO Lan.Research on Seasoned Equity Offerings and Herd Effect of Earnings Management Behavior[J].Journal of Zhengzhou University:Natural Science Edition,2006,38(1):120-124. |
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| Authors: | ZHANG Xiang-jian GUO Lan |
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| Institution: | 1. Institute of Finance and Economics, Shanghai University of Shanghai 200433, China ; 2. Shanghai Academy of Social Science, Finance and Economics, Shanghai 200020,China |
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| Abstract: | In order to seek a comparison advantage in seasoned equity offerings,each firm has strong incentive to acquire relative performance through earnings management,and enhances potential investors' assessment of its profitability and investment value.The motivation of manager's attempt to mislead investors leads to herd behavior of earnings management in seasoned equity offerings.In dynamic game,each firm does its maximum feasible amount of earnings management in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in each period,and the marginal benefits of reporting higher earnings must equal to its marginal costs. |
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| Keywords: | relative performance scarce capital seasoned equity offerings earnings management |
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