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基于模糊联盟合作博弈的企业联盟收益分配策略
引用本文:陈雯,张强.基于模糊联盟合作博弈的企业联盟收益分配策略[J].北京理工大学学报,2007,27(8):735-739.
作者姓名:陈雯  张强
作者单位:北京理工大学,管理与经济学院,北京,100081
摘    要:针对企业联盟模糊情况下的收益分配问题进行分配策略研究,通过关于模糊测度的Choquet积分,定义了模糊联盟合作博弈的支付函数v和Shapley值.并证明了支付函数v具有超可加性,以及Shapley值满足有效性、对称性、哑元性与可加性的公理体系,实例证明了企业联盟收益分配的模糊Shapley值方法.

关 键 词:企业联盟  模糊联盟合作博弈  Choquet积分  模糊测度  基于模糊  联盟收益  合作博弈  企业联盟  分配策略  Fuzzy  Cooperative  Games  Based  Coalition  Enterprise  Allocation  方法  收益分配  公理体系  哑元  对称性  有效性  可加性  Shapley  支付函数
文章编号:1001-0645(2007)08-0735-05
修稿时间:2006-10-12

Profit Allocation in Enterprise Coalition Based on Cooperative Games Under Fuzzy Coalitions
CHEN Wen and ZHANG Qiang.Profit Allocation in Enterprise Coalition Based on Cooperative Games Under Fuzzy Coalitions[J].Journal of Beijing Institute of Technology(Natural Science Edition),2007,27(8):735-739.
Authors:CHEN Wen and ZHANG Qiang
Institution:School of Management and Economics, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, China
Abstract:Profit allocation in enterprise coalition under fuzzy conditions is studied. The payoff function v and Shapley value are defined using the Choquet integral about fuzzy measures. The payoff function v thus defined is proved to have supperadditivity, and the Shapley value so defined proved to satisfy axioms such as efficiency, symmetry, dummy and additivity. The fuzzy Shapley value method for profit allocation in enterprise coalitions was thus given by examples.
Keywords:enterprise coalitions  cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions  Choquet integral  fuzzy measures
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