买方“跳单”行为下房产中介代理合约选择

依据合约理论的分析框架,研究了面对中国普遍存在的买方"跳单"行为,房产中介应当如何在开放性代理合约和独家代理合约中进行选择.首先通过模型的建立与求解分析了各合约下中介的最优的努力水平,并研究了买方"跳单"概率和卖方房屋售价对最优决策的影响.然后基于最优决策,对两种合约进行了比较,结果显示中介在独家代理时应实施更高的努力水平;若买方"跳单"概率较小,中介应该选择开放性代理;若买方"跳单"概率较大,中介应对售价较高或较低的房屋采用开放性代理,对售价处在中间水平的房屋采用独家代理.另外,数值实验表明,随着买方"跳单"概率的增加,中介应对更多的房屋采用独家代理合约.而随着独家代理费的升高,在更大的"跳单"概率范围内,中介一定不应该选择独家代理合约.

Brokerage contract selection for real estate brokers with jump-dealing buyers

According to the analysis framework of contract theory, we explore how real estate brokers select between open listing contract and exclusive agency listing contract when jump-dealing buyers exist. Through model construction and derivation, we first analyze the optimal effort level for different contracts and explore the impacts of jump-dealing probability and house price on the optimal effort levels. Then, we compare the two contracts based on the theoretical results. We find that real estate brokers will exert greater effort under exclusive agency listing contract; real estate brokers should select open listing if the jump-dealing probability is low; if the probability is high, real estate brokers should select open listing when the house price is either high or low and select exclusive agency listing contract otherwise. The numerical experiments show that real estate brokers would select exclusive agency listing contract for more houses with the increase of jump-dealing probability. However, when the exclusive agency fee increases, real estate brokers would not select exclusive agency listing for a larger region of jump-dealing probability.