基于公平偏好和长期绩效的委托代理问题研究

委托代理问题是经济学研究的重要议题,传统研究中往往假设代理人只有短期盈利一个任务目标,且认为委托人和代理人都是完全理性的,与真实情况不符.本文考虑到我国化工企业的特殊性,在经营责任目标与社会责任目标的背景下,提出代理人还具有环境污染控制任务,建立了代理人多任务下的委托代理模型;然后从考虑企业长期绩效的角度对模型予以了改进;最后将公平偏好理论引入到模型中,使其更具现实意义.研究表明:委托人对代理人的最优分享系数与各个任务之间的相关系数联系密切,并且会随着代理人的嫉妒偏好强度及同情偏好强度的增大而呈现先增大后减小的趋势.本文的研究可以为解决现实中化工企业的委托代理问题提供决策依据和参考借鉴.

Research of multi-task principal-agent problems based on fairness preference and long-term performance

The principal-agent problem is an important issue in economic research. Traditional researches used to assume that the agent has only one task: the short-term profit mission and that the principal and the agent are perfectly rational. This paper is based on the chemical enterprise in our country, and it first considers the agent with multi-task objectives; then improves the model from the point of view of long-term performance; finally introduces the fairness preference theory into the model to make it more realistic significance. The result shows that: the optimal sharing coefficient that the principal gives the agent is closely related to the correlation between the multi-tasks and it shows a trend of decrease after increase with the increase of the jealousy preference strength and sympathy preference strength of the agent. This paper can provide some decision-making basis and reference to solve the principal-agent problems of chemical enterprise in reality.