基于自执行契约设计的供应链动态博弈协调

提出了供应链一般序贯博弈中旁支付自执行契约（SSEC）设计方法,以解决已有关于旁支付契约供应链协调的研究中未能有效地考虑系统收益增量分配合理性、公平性以及过多强调博弈方自发参与旁支付契约的问题. 旁支付自执行契约设计改变了序贯博弈双方的支付函数,使得双方在新条件下的非合作动态博弈中实现了新的子博弈精炼纳什均衡与集中决策全局最优解一致;双方各自收益相对于原动态博弈实现了Pareto改进,双方的最终收益分配不悖于非合作讨价还价博弈的均衡结果.结果表明,在仍然保持供应链分散决策情形下,自执行契约设计使得序贯博弈各方在依靠个人理性(个体利益最优)决策时,取得了的集体理性下的集中决策效果.均衡特性表明自执行契约设计下新博弈决策过程的自执行性、均衡稳定性和帕累托改进性. 为了证明SSEC的有效性和实用性,把自执行契约设计方法应用于协调批量契约两级供应链模型、两寡头产量竞争动态博弈和两级供应链定价动态博弈.

Side-payment self-enforcing contract based supply chain dynamic game coordination

This paper proposed a method of designing side-payment self-enforcing contract(SSEC) to resolve some arguments that not considering rationality and fairness of allocation of profit increment and over emphasis on spontaneity of participation in side-payment contracts design based on supply chain coordination in existing research.SSEC changes payoff functions in order that the original game may evolve to a new dynamic game to make the SSEC based game achieve following characteristics,like that the equilibrium...