| 对国有企业经营者激励机制的探讨 |
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| 引用本文： | 袁庆禄,李红杰,龚廷秀.对国有企业经营者激励机制的探讨[J].山西科技,2005(5):68-69,71. |
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| 作者姓名： | 袁庆禄 李红杰 龚廷秀 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 贵州大学经济学院
2. 河南省信阳市职业技术学院 |
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| 摘 要： | 现代企业制度的“两权分离”，导致了企业委托一代理关系问题的产生。文章分析了年薪制和股票期权制两种激励机制的优劣点，国有企业在运用两种激励机制一系列现实问题。对如何找到一个适合我国现阶段国情的可操作激励模式，如何通过薪酬制度的设定来激励企业经营者、约束经营者的行为提出自己的认识和建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 委托-代理 年薪制 股票激励 |
| 文章编号： | 1004-6429（2005）05-0068-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2005-06-17 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-06-17 |
Probes into the Incentive Mechanism for Operators of State0owned Enterprises |
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| Yuan Qinglu,Li Hongjie,Gong Tingxiu.Probes into the Incentive Mechanism for Operators of State0owned Enterprises[J].Shanxi Science and Technology,2005(5):68-69,71. |
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| Authors: | Yuan Qinglu Li Hongjie Gong Tingxiu |
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| Abstract: | The "separation of two rights" in modern enterprises led to a series of problems of trust-agent relations. This article has analyzed the advantage and disadvantage of two incentive mechanisms of the yearly-salary system and share system, made clear of a series of problems in state-owned enterprises applying the two incentive systems and proposed some understanding and suggestions how to get a suitable incentive mode and how to encourage and restrain the behavior of operators through salary systems. |
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| Keywords: | trust- agent yearly- salary system stock encouraging |
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