| 面向政府采购的多属性电子拍卖机制设计 |
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| 引用本文： | 武刚,冯玉强,傅丽芳.面向政府采购的多属性电子拍卖机制设计[J].系统管理学报,2007,16(3):291-297. |
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| 作者姓名： | 武刚 冯玉强 傅丽芳 |
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| 作者单位： | 哈尔滨工业大学,管理学院,哈尔滨,150001 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金;技术、政策、管理(TPM)国家哲学社会科学创新基地资助项目 |
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| 摘 要： | 政府采购电子化提高效率节约费用是大势所趋。公开招投标是政府采购的主要方式。针对网上招投标应用局限,基于有限理性假设,结合我国国情,应用委托代理理论和进化博弈理论建立模型分析电子采购问题,提出面向政府采购的监督反馈式多属性电子拍卖机制,并对机制的有效性和合理性予以实例说明。
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| 关 键 词： | 政府采购 招投标 多属性电子拍卖 委托代理 进化博弈 监督指导 |
| 文章编号： | 1005-2542(2007)03-0291-07 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年11月28 |
Government Procurement Oriented Multi-attribute E-auction Mechanism Design |
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| WU Gang,FENG Yu-qiang,FU Li-fang.Government Procurement Oriented Multi-attribute E-auction Mechanism Design[J].Systems Engineering Theory·Methodology·Applications,2007,16(3):291-297. |
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| Authors: | WU Gang FENG Yu-qiang FU Li-fang |
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| Abstract: | It is shows a general tendency that E-procurement is applied to improve goverment procurement efficiency and reduce cost.To break the limitation existing in E-tender application which is a main E-goverment procurement mode,E-procurement mechanism is studied based on bounded rationality assumption and considering the situation of our country.After principal-agent theory and evolutionary game theory approached to propose and analyze models,a new E-procurement mechanism is designed.It is named government procurement oriented multi-attribute E-auction with supervision and feedback,and its rationality and effectiveness is discussed with an example. |
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| Keywords: | government procurement tender multi-attribute E-auction principal-agent evolutionary game supervision |
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