跨国零售商买方抗衡势力条件下的制造商工艺创新决策

构建了由垄断制造商和竞争零售商组成的纵向市场模型,在模型中引入了跨国零售商买方抗衡势力,考察了跨国零售商进入前后,制造商最优的工艺创新决策.通过比较纵向一体化、跨国零售商进入前和进入后三种情况下制造商最优的工艺创新水平,研究了跨国零售商买方抗衡势力对制造商工艺创新决策的影响.研究发现跨国零售商买方抗衡势力的增强会促进制造商的工艺创新,而且在买方抗衡势力较大的情况下,制造商最优工艺创新强度高于纵向一体化下的强度.本文对这一结论背后的机理进行了剖析,并通过算例分析了参数变化对结论的影响.

Manufacturers’ Process Innovation Decisions Under the Condition of Transnational Retailers’ Countervailing Power

A vertical market model which consists of a monopolistic manufacturer and competitive retailers was built. The manufacturers’s optimal process innovation decisions before and after the transnational retailers’ entry into the market were investigated by introducing countervailing power into the model. Moreover， the impact of the transnational retailers’ countervailing power on the manufacturers’ process innovation decisions was studied by comparing the manufacturer’s optimal process innovation decisions in three different cases， including the cases before and after the transnational retailers’ entry and the case of vertical integration. It was found that the increase of transnational retailers’ countervailing power will promote manufacturers’ process innovation. In addition， when countervailing power is large enough， the optimal level of process innovation will be higher than that in vertical integration. Finally， the mechanism behind this conclusion was analyzed， and a numerical example was given to show the influence of parameter change on the conclusion.