首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

四类拍卖的收益等价性研究
引用本文:乔 恒,邱菀华.四类拍卖的收益等价性研究[J].系统工程理论与实践,2006,26(7):118-123.
作者姓名:乔 恒  邱菀华
作者单位:北京航空航天大学经济管理学院 北京100083
基金项目:全国高等学校优秀博士学位论文作者专项基金;航空科学预研基金;中国科学院资助项目
摘    要:在收益等价性及应用的完整框架下对四类拍卖的收益等价性问题进行了总结、研究和探讨.在对收益等价定理进行推论和应用的基础上,确认了SIPV(对称、独立、私人价值)假设下四种拍卖期望收益与期望支付的等价性,推导了二价全支付拍卖的均衡竞价策略.在此基础上比较并解释了SIPV假设下四种拍卖均衡报价的排序关系.总结,比较并解释了关联价值假设下四种拍卖的期望收益的排序关系.指出不同的信息结构设定是影响不同假设下拍卖收益等价性和不同假设拍卖模型对经济现象解释能力的关键因素.最后,展望了拍卖收益等价问题的新的发展方向.

关 键 词:收益等价  全支付拍卖  拍卖
文章编号:1000-6788(2006)07-0118-06
修稿时间:2004年8月11日

Research of Revenue Equivalence of Four Kinds of Auctions
QIAO Heng,QIU Wan-hua.Research of Revenue Equivalence of Four Kinds of Auctions[J].Systems Engineering —Theory & Practice,2006,26(7):118-123.
Authors:QIAO Heng  QIU Wan-hua
Abstract:Summarization,research,and discussion of four kinds of auction forms are executed under the framework of the revenue equivalence and it applications.Based on the deductions and applications of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem under the SIPV assumption,expected revenue and expected payment of the four kinds of auctions are confirmed to be equivalent,and the equilibrium bidding strategy of the second-price all-pay auction is derived.Then the equilibrium bids of the four kinds of auctions are ranked and explained.Additionally,under signal-affiliated assumption the expected revenue of the four kinds of auctions are ranked and explained.It is concluded that different informational environment settings are crucial to the different results of revenue equivalence of auction forms and lead to different explanation abilities of auction models under different assumptions.Finally,new developments of revenue equivalence of auctions are reviewed and prospected.
Keywords:revenue equivalence principle  all-pay auction  auction
本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录!
点击此处可从《系统工程理论与实践》浏览原始摘要信息
点击此处可从《系统工程理论与实践》下载免费的PDF全文
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号